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New  Zealand’s  Pharmaceutical  Management  Agency  (PHARMAC)  has  been  highly  success-
ful in  facilitating  affordable  access  to medicines  through  a combination  of aggressive  price
negotiations,  innovative  procurement  mechanisms,  and  careful  evaluation  of  value  for
money. Recently  the  US  government,  through  the  establishment  of  a  series  of bilateral  and
plurilateral “free”  trade  agreements,  has  attempted  to constrain  the  pharmaceutical  access
programs of  other  countries  in  order to  promote  the  interests  of  the  pharmaceutical  indus-
try. The  Trans  Paciﬁc  Partnership  Agreement  (TPPA)  represents  the  latest  example;  through
the TPPA  the US  is  seeking  to eliminate  therapeutic  reference  pricing,  introduce  appeals  pro-
cesses for  pharmaceutical  companies  to  challenge  formulary  listing  and  pricing  decisions,
and introduce  onerous  disclosure  and  “transparency”  provisions  that  facilitate  industry
involvement  in  decision-making  around  coverage  and  pricing  of  medicines  (and  medical
devices).  This  paper  argues  that the US  agenda,  if successfully  prosecuted,  would  be likely
to increase  costs  and  reduce  access  to affordable  medicines  for New  Zealanders.  This  would
in turn  be  likely  to  exacerbate  known  inequities  in access  to medicines  and  thus  dispropor-
advant
hors. Ptionately  affect  dis
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. IntroductionPharmaceutical coverage and reimbursement programs
re important not only for facilitating affordable access to
edicines, but also for containing health care costs and
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ensuring value for money [1,2]. The manner in which they
operate – the way  decisions are made about which drugs
to subsidise and how much to pay – can have profound
consequences for people’s health [1].
Recent US free trade agreements have included pro-
visions intended to impose constraints on coverage and
reimbursement programs for medicines and medical
devices. The US is proposing similar provisions in a new
regional trade agreement currently under negotiation, the
Trans Paciﬁc Partnership Agreement (TPPA). At the time of
writing, there are 12 countries participating in the nego-
tiations: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States,
Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license.and Vietnam. The inclusion of provisions in this agreement
that affect pharmaceutical and medical device coverage
programs will have consequences for access and equity in
many of the TPPA countries, both now and into the future.
r CC BY-NC-SA license.
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This paper looks at New Zealand’s Pharmaceutical
Management Agency (PHARMAC) – how it operates,
its effectiveness in comparison with programs in other
countries – and the likely impact of the TPPA on its abil-
ity to provide access to affordable medicines and related
products. The potential effects of provisions proposed by
the US in draft text leaked in 2011 on PHARMAC’s oper-
ation are explored, the likely outcomes and health equity
implications discussed, and lessons for New Zealand and
other countries drawn out.
2. PHARMAC
PHARMAC, New Zealand’s Pharmaceutical Management
Agency, was established in 1993 in response to rising prices
for medicines [3]. Initially established to subsidise com-
munity medicines, its role was recently expanded to cover
hospital medicines, and it will soon take on purchasing of
medical devices for hospitals as well [4].
PHARMAC differs from many other pharmaceutical
pricing and reimbursement programs in that it combines
many functions (management of the formulary, assess-
ment of comparative effectiveness and cost effectiveness,
reimbursement decisions, price negotiation, procurement,
management of the budget, and payment functions) within
one organisation, enabling a greater degree of control over
expenditure than some other programs [1]. PHARMAC is
also different in that it is required to operate within a
capped annual budget, and it has a legal obligation to secure
“the best health outcomes that are reasonably achiev-
able from pharmaceutical treatment and from within the
amount of funding provided” [1].
PHARMAC has two advisory committees. The Pharma-
cology and Therapeutics Advisory Committee (PTAC), is an
expert committee that considers the evidence against a
set of decision criteria and makes recommendations as to
whether new drugs should be added to the Pharmaceuti-
cal Schedule, and what priority they should be given [5].
PTAC makes recommendations to PHARMAC; PHARMAC
then considers cost-effectiveness and budgetary consider-
ations and negotiates with suppliers. PHARMAC’s decisions
are also informed by a Consumer Advisory Committee [5].
Decisions about which drugs to subsidise and what pri-
ority to give them are informed by a set of nine decision
criteria (see Box 1). These decision criteria are essentially
factors that are taken into account in decision making,
rather than decision rules per se. PHARMAC may  apply
discretion in how these are weighted and applied [2].
PHARMAC is very effective in using market competition
to drive down prices [6]. A range of commercial purchas-
ing strategies is employed to ensure value for money. These
are shown in Box 2. Of particular signiﬁcance are negotia-
tion (primarily used for medicines under patent, for which
there are no generic alternatives), tendering for sole sub-
sidised supply (a key strategy for obtaining generics at low
prices), therapeutic reference pricing (linking the price of
medicines to existing medicines with similar therapeutic
effects) and multi-product agreements, where price reduc-
tions on older medicines are negotiated by bundling them
together with new products considered for subsidy [7]. 112 (2013) 227– 233
3. Pharmaceutical expenditure – international
comparisons
PHARMAC’s processes have ensured that New Zealand
performs well on many measures of pharmaceutical expen-
diture when compared with most other OECD countries.
In 2009, New Zealand’s per capita expenditure for pre-
scribed medicines was  237 USD PPP compared with 370 for
Australia and 815 for the United States [8]. In that year New
Zealand also spent only 0.9% of GDP on pharmaceuticals
in comparison with the OECD average of 1.5% [8]. Within
the OECD only Denmark, Luxembourg and Norway spent
a lower proportion of GDP on pharmaceuticals, while the
United States spent more than 2% [8].
4. PHARMAC’s effectiveness
Growth in pharmaceutical expenditure has also slowed
since the establishment of PHARMAC [2,3,9]. According to
PHARMAC’s 2012 annual report [10], more than $5 bil-
lion has been saved since 2000 as a result of PHARMAC’s
strategies for containing costs (based on 1999 pharmaceu-
tical prices). During the period 1993–2007, the number of
medicines on the pharmaceutical schedule and the number
of prescriptions increased signiﬁcantly [2]. However PHAR-
MAC’s success at cost containment also means that more of
the health budget is available to be invested in other health
services [3,10].
Co-payments for medicines in New Zealand are also
low by international standards. Since January 2013, co-
payments for fully subsidised medicines have been set
at a ﬂat rate of $5 NZD (equivalent to approximately $4
AUD), with additional charges for some medicines that are
not fully subsidised [11]. Once an individual/family has
obtained 20 subsidised items in a 12 month period, the
copayment is waived [11]. In comparison, co-payments in
Australia are up to $36.10 AUD for most beneﬁciaries and
$5.90 AUD for concession card holders [12].
There are nevertheless inevitable trade offs between
affordability and the availability of newer and more expen-
sive drugs. A 2012 study comparing access to medicines
in single-payer systems in the US, the UK, Australia and
New Zealand [1] found that the NZ program subsidised
fewer, older and ‘less innovative’ drugs. Another study
comparing the impact of cost containment policies on the
range of medicines available and subsidised in Finland and
New Zealand also found that NZ tended to subsidise older
medicines – but the level of subsidy was higher in NZ, mak-
ing medicines more affordable for patients [9].
5. US free trade agreements and pharmaceutical
pricing and reimbursement programs
Because of its effectiveness in negotiating prices for
medicines, PHARMAC has long been in the sights of the
pharmaceutical industry. The 2012 special 301 watch
report of the United States Trade Representative cites US
industry concerns over “unfair reimbursement policies” in
several countries, and particularly the operation of PHAR-
MAC:
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Box 1: PHARMAC’s decision criteria
• The health needs of all eligible people within New Zealand;
• The particular health needs of Ma¯ori and Paciﬁc peoples;
• The availability and suitability of existing medicines, therapeutic medical devices and related products and related
things;
• The clinical beneﬁts and risks of pharmaceuticals;
• The cost-effectiveness of meeting health needs by funding pharmaceuticals rather than using other publicly funded
health and disability support services;
• The budgetary impact (in terms of the pharmaceutical budget and the government’s overall health budget) of any
changes to the Pharmaceutical schedule;
• The direct cost to health service users;
• The Government’s priorities for health funding, as set out in any objectives notiﬁed by the Crown to PHARMAC, or in
PHARMAC’s Funding Agreement, or elsewhere; and
• Such other criteria as PHARMAC thinks ﬁt. PHARMAC will carry out appropriate consultation when it intends to take
any such ‘other criteria’ into account.
Source: PHARMAC (2012) Making Funding Decisions. Available from:
http://www.pharmac.govt.nz/2011/09/16/04FUNDING DECISIONS.pdf
Box 2: PHARMAC’s commercial purchasing strategies
• Negotiation
• Tendering
• Alternative commercial proposals (ACPs)
• Requests for proposals (RFPs)
• Reference pricing
• Rebates
• Expenditure caps
• Multi-product agreements
able fr
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“The industry continues to express concerns regarding,
mong other things, the lack of transparency, fairness, and
redictability of the PHARMAC pricing and reimbursement
egime, as well as the negative aspects of the overall climate
or innovative medicines in New Zealand [13, p. 21]”.
In recent years, the US Government has sought more
avourable market access for its pharmaceutical industry
hrough bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements. The
rst attempt to modify another country’s drug coverage
rogram was made in the Australia–US Free Trade Agree-
ent, which came into force in January 2005. However,
lthough some process changes were made to the Aus-
ralian Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Scheme (PBS), the core
isting and pricing mechanisms of the program remained
nchanged, and the US was unsuccessful in its pursuit of
he industry’s key offensive interests [14,15]. A second and
ar more successful attempt was made in 2007 as part of the
egotiation of a bilateral free trade agreement with South
orea (KORUS), and led to much more substantial changes
o the operation of various South Korean programs [14,15].
More recently, the US pharmaceutical industry has
ought to use negotiations for the Trans Paciﬁc Partner-
hip (TPPA) to constrain the operation of pharmaceutical
overage and reimbursement programs in several other
ountries. While among the negotiating countries to
ate only Australia and New Zealand have established
ational pharmaceutical coverage programs, the eventualom:
infosheet-05-purchasing-medicines-2013.pdf
provisions of the TPPA may  well circumscribe the manner
in which any future programs are developed in the other
TPPA parties, and will extend to any countries that sign up
to the TPPA in future [14,16].
Leaked negotiating documents [17] show that in the
TPPA negotiations, the US has proposed similar provisions
to those in KORUS. However, the US ambitions extend
beyond even KORUS – both in reach (extending to devel-
oping countries) and in scope.
6. 2011 US Transparency Chapter Annex draft text –
analysis of likely effects on PHARMAC
While draft text proposed by the US in 2011 for
an ‘Annex on Transparency and Procedural Fairness for
Healthcare Technologies’ (hereafter referred to as the 2011
draft TPPA annex) [17] was reportedly rejected by all other
TPPA parties, revised text tabled at the September 2012
round of negotiations (which is not publicly available) has
been described as not signiﬁcantly different from earlier
versions [18]. Here we  examine six issues of particular
concern in the 2011 draft TPPA annex that have implica-
tions for PHARMAC (as well as the other TPPA countries).
These are not the only issues of concern, but those most
likely to present particular difﬁculty to PHARMAC. They
are:
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• Text that may  preclude the use of therapeutic reference
pricing;
• Introduction of an appeals process that would allow chal-
lenges to PHARMAC’s decisions;
• Requirements to specify and disclose formulary decision
criteria (which may  create inﬂexibilities);
• Transparency and disclosure requirements that may
undermine price negotiations;
• Mechanisms for ongoing engagement that would facili-
tate further industry inﬂuence; and
• Text mandating the legalisation of direct-to-consumer
advertising of prescription medicines via the internet.
6.1. Therapeutic reference pricing
A core concern for all TPPA countries that use (or seek to
use) therapeutic reference pricing or other forms of admin-
istered pricing, is the inclusion of text that speciﬁes that
reimbursement amounts must be determined on the basis
of “competitive market-derived prices in the Party’s ter-
ritory” or “an alternative transparent and veriﬁable basis
consisting of other benchmarks that appropriately recog-
nise the value of the patented or generic pharmaceutical
products or medical devices at issue” [2011 TPPA Annex
Art. X.3(d)]. It is not clear how such benchmarks would,
or indeed could be derived and what would be deemed
‘appropriate’.
Critical wording within AUSFTA enabled Australia
to retain its evidence-based processes for formulary
decision-making. References to “objectively demonstrated
therapeutic signiﬁcance” – which protected Australia’s
capacity to continue to apply assessments of comparative
effectiveness and cost effectiveness in formulary decision-
making and apply therapeutic reference pricing – are
notably absent from KORUS and from the text referring to
the basis for determining the reimbursement amount in
the 2011 draft TPPA annex [14,15].
6.2. Appeals process
The 2011 draft TPPA annex includes a provision [Art.
X.3(i)] specifying that the TPPA countries will introduce
an independent appeal or review process that covers both
listing and pricing decisions. This goes signiﬁcantly further
than AUSFTA Annex 2-C which required an independent
review process which only applied to recommendations by
the Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Advisory Committee (PBAC)
not to list a drug on the Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Scheme
[14,15]. Australia’s independent review process was  also
limited in several important ways – for example, no new
evidence may  be presented (if new evidence is available
then the applicant must resubmit rather than go to review,
and reviews can only consider speciﬁc issues in dispute).
The ﬁndings of a review are then reconsidered by the PBAC
and if inconsistent with its original ﬁndings, PBAC may con-
sider whether they are sufﬁciently persuasive to require
a reconsideration of its original recommendation [14,15].
The ﬁndings of a review thus cannot make an alternative
recommendation or overturn the original recommendation
of the Committee. 112 (2013) 227– 233
In contrast to the limited review process established
by the AUSFTA, the appeal process speciﬁed in KORUS
allows for appeal regarding any decision regarding listing
or pricing [14,15]. Prior to the ratiﬁcation of KORUS, South
Korea introduced an appeal mechanism that can result in
the re-evaluation of applications to its expert Drug Ben-
eﬁt Coverage Assessment Committee [19]. A side letter
to KORUS also speciﬁes that the appeal mechanism must
involve establishment of a review body, which carries the
risk that a designated panel of non experts could overturn
the decisions of experts [14,15].
Currently PHARMAC does not have a formal appeal or
review mechanism, but pharmaceutical companies seeking
different outcomes are able to resubmit applications [20]
and can challenge PHARMAC’s decisions in court. Introduc-
tion of a formal appeal or review mechanism, pertaining
to both listing and pricing decisions and able to overturn
PTAC’s recommendations (as indicated in the 2011 draft
TPPA annex), would facilitate pharmaceutical company
challenges to formulary decision making. Depending on
the nature of the appeal mechanism and the way  in which
it is implemented, it could also undermine the scientiﬁc
rigour of PHARMAC’s process by supplanting the decisions
of experts with those of a less expert body. Establishment
of an appeal body could lead to decisions that undermine
PHARMAC’s attempts to achieve distributional fairness in
expenditure. The establishment of an appeal body not sub-
ject to the same budgetary constraints as PHARMAC would
be a particular concern for New Zealand. Even the existence
of an appeals mechanism could have a ‘chilling’ effect on
PHARMAC’s decision-making processes.
6.3. Speciﬁcation and disclosure of decision criteria
The 2011 draft TPPA annex includes a disclosure
requirement applying to procedural rules and decision
criteria used to determine pricing or reimbursement [Art.
X.3(b)]. Again this goes further than the AUSFTA, which
includes a requirement that appears similar but in fact only
applies to decisions about listing, not pricing [14,15]. This
could mean that PHARMAC’s ﬂexibility in applying its deci-
sion criteria could well be lost, locally signiﬁcant decision
criteria could be supplanted by rigid decision rules, and any
variation from them could then become grounds for appeal.
6.4. “Transparency” provisions
PHARMAC’s success in negotiating low prices for
medicines depends on its effective use of competition,
which depends in turn on price information being kept
conﬁdential [6].
The 2011 draft TPPA annex includes a number of pro-
visions that seek to increase “transparency”. At face value,
this seems reasonable. But PHARMAC is particularly vul-
nerable to these types of provisions because its price
negotiations need to take place in conditions of conﬁ-
dentiality. Text such as this might require PHARMAC to
identify/disclose price information, or reasons for selecting
a speciﬁc supplier (thereby providing grounds for appeal).
The pharmaceutical industry claims that PHARMAC is
not sufﬁciently transparent and that the TPPA proposals
th Policy
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ill be improvements [21]. However in many respects
HARMAC is already transparent. For example, while
ssessments of evidence conducted by PTAC are not pub-
icly available, minutes of PTAC meetings are posted on
HARMAC’s website and minutes of subcommittee meet-
ngs are also published following review by PTAC [22].
.5. Cooperative mechanisms for ongoing engagement
A placeholder in the 2011 draft TPPA annex [Art. X.6.2]
efers to possible mechanisms for international cooper-
tion. The US is likely to seek similar arrangements to
hose established for KORUS. Under KORUS, a Medicines
nd Medical Devices Committee has been established
ith a far more extensive and inﬂuential remit than the
edicines Working Group set up under the AUSFTA, which
s essentially a discussion forum [14,15]. The commit-
ee established under KORUS is co-chaired by health and
rade ofﬁcials, has a speciﬁc mandate for monitoring and
mplementing the pharmaceuticals and medical devices
rovisions of KORUS, is required to meet at least once a
ear and reports to the Joint Committee [14,15]. Such a
ommittee could have the ability to inﬂuence domestic pol-
cy in New Zealand in ways that promote the interests of
he pharmaceutical and medical device industries at the
xpense of affordable access for the public.
.6. Institutionalisation of direct-to-consumer
dvertising
The 2011 draft TPPA annex includes a clause mandating
he legalisation of direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA)
ia the internet [Art. X.4]. While New Zealand already per-
its direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceuticals,
here is a mounting body of evidence that suggests that
TCA carries more harms than beneﬁts [see, for example,
3–26]. Accepting this provision in the TPPA could effec-
ively ‘lock in’ DTCA for the future and prevent NZ from
aking different policy choices in response to new evi-
ence or changing circumstances.
While by no means benign, DTCA does not present as
igniﬁcant a problem in New Zealand as in the US, this in
arge part because of the tight controls PHARMAC wields
ver which drugs are subsidised in NZ [23]. However, were
ome degree of control to be lost through other TPPA provi-
ions that required changes to PHARMAC’s processes, DTCA
ight well represent a more signiﬁcant risk to prescribing
atterns and expenditure than is currently the case.
. Other TPPA provisions likely to adversely impact
HARMAC
Beyond the proposed Annex on Transparency and Pro-
edural Fairness for Healthcare Technologies, two other
reas of the TPPA text could affect PHARMAC’s ability to
ontain pharmaceutical expenditure and ensure access to
ffordable medicines in New Zealand. Proposals made by
he US to extend intellectual property rights (IPRs) for
harmaceuticals [27,28], if accepted, would expand patent
rotection and delay the introduction of generic medicines 112 (2013) 227– 233 231
through a range of provisions that extend well beyond
existing patent law in New Zealand [14,16,29] including:
• extending patentability to cover new forms, uses and
methods of using a known product (even without evi-
dence of additional beneﬁt);
• requiring countries to allow patents for diagnostic, ther-
apeutic and surgical methods;
• adjustments to the term of patents to compensate for
delays in issuing patents or in providing marketing
approval;
• elimination of the process for opposing patent claims
before they are granted (a safeguard that can be used to
prevent unwarranted patents from being granted);
• provision for at least 5 years of data exclusivity for new
pharmaceutical products, plus an additional 3 years for
new uses of existing drugs, and possibly up to 12 years
for biologics; and
• linking marketing approval for generic drugs to patent
status – requiring regulatory authorities to scan for exist-
ing patents, provide notiﬁcation to patent holders, and
delay granting marketing approval until any disputes are
settled.
Extensions to originators’ monopoly periods and con-
sequent delays in the market entry of generics could
be expected to seriously compromise PHARMAC’s abil-
ity to source low cost generic drugs. Extensions to IPRs
could therefore prove to be one of the greatest threats
posed by the TPPA to New Zealanders’ access to affordable
medicines.
A proposed investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
provision, which leaked text suggests is supported by
New Zealand [30], could provide an additional avenue for
pharmaceutical companies to challenge, in international
tribunals, domestic pharmaceutical policy processes and
decisions that are perceived to affect the value of their
investments.
8. Likely impact on the cost of medicines, health
equity and indigenous rights
If PHARMAC were to become less effective at containing
pharmaceutical costs post-TPPA, there are three possible
outcomes, all of which have implications for the health
of the New Zealand public, as well as health equity and
indigenous rights.
One possible outcome is a rise in co-payments (higher
out of pocket costs for prescriptions) to offset increased
acquisition costs. Increased co-payments are likely to dis-
proportionately disadvantage those New Zealanders who
are least able to pay the extra costs, in particular peo-
ple from low-income households and beneﬁciaries. Ma¯ori,
indigenous New Zealanders, are over-represented among
these groups. Jatrana et al. [31] studied ethnic differences
in access to prescription medicines in New Zealand. They
found that during a 12 month period, Ma¯ori and Paciﬁc
peoples were approximately three times more likely than
New Zealanders of European background to have post-
poned purchasing a prescription medicine at least once
because they could not afford the cost of the medicine.
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These ﬁndings are consistent with international literature
that shows that groups most likely to report cost barri-
ers include ‘elderly, women, non-white and low-income
populations’ [31].
Cost barriers result in decreased medication use for seri-
ous illnesses, low adherence to treatment and higher risk
of hospitalisation, leading ultimately to adverse health care
outcomes and higher economic costs to society [31]. As well
as experiencing cost barriers to use of prescription medica-
tions, Ma¯ori and Paciﬁc peoples have higher health needs
and experience other barriers to healthcare services [31].
Secondly, if the rising costs of pharmaceuticals are
not met  by increased co-payments, they could be met  by
either increasing government health funding (Vote Health)
or by increasing the proportion of Vote Health allocated
to pharmaceuticals. This latter proposal would probably
mean decreasing the funding to other essential publically
funded health services. Such funding cuts may  particularly
affect services targeted to high needs population groups
rather than ‘mainstream’ health services.
Finally, the third possibility is increased rationing, by
restricting either the range of medicines that are subsidised
or by the more extensive use of restricted access criteria.
Currently there is evidence of signiﬁcant under-utilisation
of pharmaceuticals by Ma¯ori aged less than 15 years [32]. It
is possible that efforts to restrict access could lead to further
inequities.
New Zealand, like many nations internationally, is com-
mitted to the elimination of health inequity [33]. Adopting
policies that will, in all likelihood, increase inequities in
health would seem to be acting against the spirit of the
New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act. Furthermore,
adopting policy in the knowledge that Ma¯ori health will
be further marginalised would breach the intention of the
government to act in good faith in respect of the Treaty
of Waitangi and would be an infringement of indigenous
rights.
Increasing co-payments and introducing tighter
rationing would both be politically costly options. It seems
the most likely governmental response, should the New
Zealand government agree to alter PHARMAC’s operation
consistent with US ambitions, would be to devote a
greater share of health expenditure to pharmaceuticals
and medical devices in order to offset increased costs.
However, as we have argued above, this option may also
increase inequities, as disadvantaged groups tend to be
affected more by cuts to other health and community
services.
The New Zealand government has maintained through-
out the TPPA negotiations that the “fundamentals” of
PHARMAC are not negotiable in the TPPA [34]. However,
it is unclear which features of PHARMAC are considered
fundamental to its operation and whether the govern-
ment may  in fact be considering conceding to procedural
changes that may  substantially affect PHARMAC’s oper-
ations. In December 2012, New Zealand’s trade minister
reportedly indicated his preparedness to be “somewhat
ﬂexible” in response to US concerns about PHARMAC
[35].
Many provisions in the 2011 draft TPPA annex tabled
by the US could undermine the operation of PHARMAC. 112 (2013) 227– 233
While this text is said to have been superseded, a subse-
quent revised draft reportedly retains many key issues of
concern. The best case scenario would be for all TPPA
countries to refuse to accept any provisions that would
circumscribe programs for subsidising medicines and med-
ical devices. However, if the TPPA countries agree to
negotiate such provisions, it will be vitally important for
policy makers to understand the nuances of the texts and
their implications for institutions and programs such as
PHARMAC, so that risks to public health and equity are
given appropriate weight in the negotiations. Meaning-
ful engagement with health sector stakeholders (including
health organisations and pharmaceutical policy experts) is
important for ensuring that such risks are fully understood
and that the advancement of sound health policy is priori-
tised over the lure of potential gains to other sectors of the
economy.
9. Conclusions
PHARMAC is a highly effective model for containing
costs while ensuring affordable access – important to pre-
serve not just for New Zealanders, but also as a potential
model for other countries to adopt. PHARMAC’s processes
are particularly vulnerable in the TPPA negotiations. Any
intrusion into domestic decision-making about medicines
– even seemingly reasonable requirements for greater
“transparency” – could have adverse consequences for
PHARMAC’s ability to manage expenditure and ensure
value for money, and potentially serious effects on health
expenditure, health equity and indigenous rights.
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